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Abstract. Payment protocols developed to realize off-chain transactions in Payment channel
network (PCN) assumes the underlying routing algorithm transfers the payment via a single
path. However, a path may not have sufficient capacity to route a transaction. It is inevitable
to split the payment across multiple paths. If we run independent instances of the protocol on
each path, the execution may fail in some of the paths, leading to partial transfer of funds. A
payer has to reattempt the entire process for the residual amount. We propose a secure and
privacy-preserving payment protocol, CryptoMaze. Instead of independent paths, the funds
are transferred from sender to receiver across several payment channels responsible for routing,
in a breadth-first fashion. Payments are resolved faster at reduced setup cost, compared to
existing state-of-the-art. Correlation among the partial payments in captured, guaranteeing
atomicity. Further, two party ECDSA signature can be used for establishing scriptless locks
among parties involved in the payment. It reduces space overhead by leveraging on core
Bitcoin scripts. We provide a formal model in the Universal Composability framework and
state the privacy goals achieved by CryptoMaze. We compare the performance of our protocol
with the existing single path based payment protocol, Multi-hop HTLC, applied iteratively
on one path at a time on several instances. It is observed that CryptoMaze requires less
communication overhead and low execution time, demonstrating efficiency and scalability.
Keywords: Payment Channel Network; Breadth-First Traversal; Privacy; Atomicity.
1 Introduction
Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin [39], is gaining prominence as an alternative method of payment.
Blockchain, a decentralized public ledger, forms the backbone of such currencies. It not only allows
transacting parties to remain pseudonymous but also guarantees reliability and security. The records
stored in this distributed ledger are immutable and can be verified by anyone in the network. It is
replicated across users who use consensus algorithms like Proof-of-Work [39], [40], [9], Proof-of-Stake
[28], [29]) for reaching an agreement. However, consensus algorithms have their own computation-
overhead and quite resource-intensive. It slows down the performance and reduces scalability [13],
[41]. Hence, scaling blockchain transactions has become a pressing concern, in order to compete
with traditional methods of payment like Visa, PayPal [51] etc.
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1.1 Background
In this section, we provide the required background on the payment channel network, routing and
atomic multi-path payment. The terms source/payer means the sender node. Similarly, sink/payee/destination
means the receiver node and transaction means payment transfer.
Payment Channel Several Layer 2 solutions like [14], [15], [32] have been proposed for enhancing
scalability of Blockchain. Amongst these, Payment Channel, like Lightning Network for Bitcoin [41]
and Raiden Network for Ethereum [4], stood out as a widely deployed solution. Any two users, with
mutual consent, can open a payment channel by locking their funds. These two parties can perform
several off-chain payments between themselves, without recording it on blockchain. This is done by
locally agreeing on the new deposit balance, enforced cryptographically by hash-based scripts [41],
scriptless locking [35]. A party can close the payment channel, with or without the cooperation of
counterparty, broadcasting the latest transaction on blockchain. Broadcasting of older transaction
leads to loss of funds of the cheating party. Since opening and closing of payment channel is a costly
operation, in terms of time and amount of funds locked, parties that are not connected directly
leverage on the set of existing payment channels for transfer of funds. This set of payment channels
form the Payment Channel Network or PCN [41].
Payment Channel Network A Payment Channel Network (PCN) [34] is defined as a bidirected
graph G := (V,E), where V is the set of accounts dealing with cryptocurrency and E is the
set of payment channels opened between a pair of accounts. A PCN is defined with respect to a
blockchain. Apart from the opening and closing of the payment channel, none of the transaction
gets recorded on the blockchain. Upon closing the channel, cryptocurrency gets deposited into each
user’s wallet according to the most recent balance in the payment channel. Every node v ∈ V
charge a processing fee fee(v), for relaying funds across the network. Each payment channel (vi, vj)
has an associated capacity cap(vi, vj), denoting the amount locked by vi and cap(vj , vi) denoting
the amount locked by vj . remain(vi, vj) signifies the residual amount of coins vi can transfer to
vj . Suppose that a node s, also denoted by v0, wants to transfer amount α to node r through
a path v0 → v1 → v2 . . . → vn → r, with each node vi charging a processing fee fee(vi). If
remain(vi, vi+1) ≥ αi : αi = α − Σnk=ifee(vk), i ∈ [0, n − 1], then funds can be relayed across the
channel (vi, vi+1). The capacity is updated as follows : remain(vi, vi+1) = remain(vi, vi+1) − αi
and remain(vi+1, vi) = remain(vi+1, vi) + αi.
Routing Payment across a Single Path The major challenge in designing any protocol for
PCN is to ensure the privacy of the payer and payee and hiding the payment value transferred. No
party, other than the payer and payee, should get any information about the transaction. Routing
algorithm generally focused on finding a single path for routing a transaction and were centralized in
nature. Canal [50] uses a centralized server for computing the path, Flare [42] requires intermediate
nodes to inform the source node about their residual capacity. However, in order to preserve the
transaction privacy, it was not in the best interest to have a single coordinator with all information
control the routing algorithm.
Any routing or payment algorithm designed for such a network must be decentralized, where
individual nodes take decisions based on the information received from its neighbor. Several payment
algorithms like [38], [21], [37], [34], [35] deal with the transfer of payment between payer and payee
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across a single path. However, finding a single route for routing high-valued transaction becomes a
challenging task, especially after several payments got executed in the network. Channels in a path
may not have sufficient balance to relay the funds. It is better to split such high-valued transaction
across several paths. This is analogous to the situation of breaking a high-valued transaction into
several microtransactions.
Splitting Payment across Multiple Paths and Problem of Atomicity
As discussed, it is better to split the high-valued transaction and transmit it over different paths. It
eliminates the constraint of finding out a single route from sender to receiver with sufficient channel
capacity to support larger payment. Several distributed routing algorithms [43], [42], [33], [45], [50],
[53], [26], [36] have been proposed for relaying transaction across multiple paths. But applying
existing privacy-preserving payment protocols on each of the path concurrently doesn’t guarantee
atomicity. Each instance of the protocol runs independent of the other. It is quite possible that
an instance of the protocol might fail in a particular path due to resource constraint or malicious
behavior of nodes [18], [44]. In the example shown in Fig. 1, payment from sender S to receiver R
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Fig. 1: Failure of payment in path S->D->E->R
is split across three paths, S->D->E->R, S->B->C->R and S->F->G->R. On each path, Hashed
Timelock Contract [41] is used concurrently for ensuring secure transfer of funds. For the two paths
S->B->C->R and S->F->G->R, the payment hash used is H(x) and H(y) with R releasing the
preimage x and y respectively. However for the path S->D->E->R, R does not have the preimage.
It immediately reports error and cancels contract with E. E in turn asks D to cancel contract and
finally S cancels contract with D, resulting in payment failure. But this results in partial of transfer,
violating atomicity. This problem is encountered since each path is considered in isolation and the
commitment used across each path are not correlated.
Atomic Multi-Path Payment The goal of the receiver is to receive the full payment. In other
words, the payment must be atomic - either all the microtransactions succeeds or it fails com-
pletely. If funds get transferred partially, sender has to make several attempts for the residual
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amount. Existing payment protocols like [2], [8] uses secret sharing [47] for achieving correlation in
commitments used across multiple paths. Receiver is able to claim payment if and only if all the
paths have confirmed locking of funds for transfer of payments. It reconstructs the secrets from the
shares received and resolves the payment. This method guarantees atomicity but either at the cost
of high latency or redundancy, involving high computation overhead. Failure of forwarding payment
across some path stalls the entire transaction.
This leads to the question of whether is it possible to design an efficient, atomic payment protocol
with low setup cost, ensuring secure transfer of funds from payer to payee across several paths (not
necessarily edge-disjoint) in the network.
1.2 High Level Overview of CryptoMaze
S A
B
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D R
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Roll back contract
Fig. 2: Protocol fails in node C of p2
Considering all the above factors, we reached a conclusion that if we want to achieve atomicity
as well as low latency, it is better to avoid sending payments via multiple paths. In a flow network,
except the source and sink, the incoming flow is equal the outgoing flow. So if a node knows the
total cumulative flow and does not receive enough incoming off-chain contracts accounting for it,
then it will abort the protocol without proceeding further. In multiple path setting, only receiver
has knowledge of the number of partial payments created. Consider the case as shown in Fig.2,
with a off-chain contract established on path p1 = 〈S,A,B,D,R〉 and path p2 = 〈S,A,C,D,R〉,
concurrently. If the payment protocol encounters error at node C of path p2, then the contracts
will be canceled in the channels AC and SA corresponding to p2. However, R will wait for certain
time before triggering failure on path p1. Except R, none of the intermediate nodes knew about the
correlation between off-chain contracts established in p1 and p2.
We propose a new privacy-preserving payment protocol, CryptoMaze, providing an instantiation
of the same in Fig. 3. Each node involved in the payment has knowledge about its incoming contracts
and outgoing contracts and information about the neighbours which will be sending the request for
contract formation. This information helps in faster resolution of payments in the event of failure.
Over here, D knows that it will receive incoming contracts from both B and C. Upon not receiving
any response from node C, it would have triggered a failure, asking B to cancel all its incoming
off-chain contracts. Meanwhile C would have triggered failure as well, canceling contracts on AC. A
needs at least one signal from any of its outgoing neighbour for canceling all the incoming contracts.
It receives one, either from B or C and cancels contract established with S. The benefit of forming
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Fig. 3: Handling failure of payment in CryptoMaze
contract on each channel in a breadth first fashion minimizes the number of contract established
on shared edges, as paths need not be edge-disjoint.
1.3 Our Contributions
– We have proposed a privacy-preserving payment protocol, CryptoMaze, for secure transfer of
funds from payer to payee, guaranteeing atomicity, i.e. either the payment succeeds fully or
fails entirely. It transfers funds across across several payment channels involved in routing in a
breath-first fashion, instead of considering each path individually. This ensures faster resolution
of payment.
– Two party ECDSA signature [35] can be easily integrated into our framework for establishing
scritpless locking. This reduces space overhead unlike other script-based payment protocols which
depends on cryptographic primitives.
– We have defined the privacy notions of CryptoMaze based on the Universal Composability frame-
work and provided a detailed security analysis. The security of our proposed scheme depends on
the discrete logarithm problem in random oracle.
– We have implemented the proposed protocol on real instances - Ripple Network [34] and Lightning
Network [46]. The code is given in [1]. CryptoMaze takes around 10s to complete the payment
with a communication overhead of less than 1.5 MB compared to Multi-hop HTLC, which takes
around 65s to complete the protocol and incurs a communication overhead of 26 MB. In an
instance of Lightning Network, it takes around 485ms and communication overhead of 0.16 MB
as compared to 10.6s and communication overhead of 24 MB by Multi-hop HTLC.
– The proposed payment protocol is modular and functionally independent and hence works per-
fectly for any underlying routing algorithm.
1.4 Organization
Section 2 defines the problem statement, privacy goals and a formal definition of the security under
Universal Composability Model is given in Section 2.2. The basic operations in ideal world is stated
in Section 2.3. The details of our proposed protocol is stated in Section 3, with formal description
of CryptoMaze in Section 3.4 and its privacy analysis in Section 3.5. Performance Analysis of
CryptoMaze protocol is provided in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the state-of-the-art in PCN and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Problem Statement & Motivation
We formalize the notion of a PCN which allows faster atomic transfer of payment from sender to
receiver. An ideal world functionality for the PCN has been provided, discussing the privacy goals.
Definition 1. A PCN is defined as a bidirected graph G := (V,E), where V is the set of ac-
counts dealing with cryptocurrency and E is the set of payment channels opened between a pair
of accounts. Each payment channel is defined by tuple (id(Ui,Uj), β
start
i , β
start
j , β
current
i , β
current
j , t),
where id(Ui,Uj) is the channel identifier, β
start
Ui
denotes the initial deposit amount of Ui in the chan-
nel, βstartUj denotes the initial deposit amount of Uj in the channel, β
current
Ui
denotes the current
balance of Ui in the channel, βcurrentUj denotes the current balance of Uj in the channel, where
βstartUi + β
start
Uj
= βcurrentUi + β
current
Uj
and t is the channel timeout period. We consider a blockchain
B which will records the node’s bitcoin address, denoted by Ui, and its on-chain balance, addressed
by B[Ui]. The current timestamp of blockchain as time(B). Basic operations of PCN consists three
operations (openPaymentChannel,closePaymentChannel,payChannel) -
– openPaymentChannel(Ui, Uj , βi, βj , t) → {0, 1} : For a given pair of accounts Ui, Uj ∈ V , with
initial balances βi and βj, B[Ui] ≥ βi, B[Uj ≥ βj, and a channel timeout period as t, Ui and
Uj mutually cooperate to open a channel denoted by (idi,j , βi, βj , βi, βj , t) ∈ E, where idi,j is the
channel identifier, provided both Ui and Uj has authorized to do so. If it succeeds, the blockchain
is updated as follows: B[Ui] = B[Ui]− βi and B[Uj ] = B[Uj ]− βj and it returns 1. Upon failure,
it returns 0.
– closePaymentChannel(idi,j) → {0, 1} : Given a channel identifier idi,j for channel (Ui, Uj),
retrieve (idi,j , βstarti , βstartj , βcurrenti , βcurrentj , t) ∈ E. If timeout period t has expired, i.e. t <
time(B) then update B as follows : B[Ui] = B[Ui] + βstarti and B[Uj ] = B[Uj ] + βstartj , remove
the entry from E and return 0. Else, update blockchain as follows: B[Ui] = B[Ui] + βcurrenti and
B[Uj ] = B[Uj ] + β
current
j , remove the entry from E and return 1.
– payChannel({idi,j : (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, val)→ {0, 1} : Given a set of payment channels PC respon-
sible for relaying of funds val from payer U0 to payee Un. PC is denoted by set of channel identi-
fiers idi,j , Ui, Uj ∈ V . Retrieve (idi,j , βstarti , βstartj , βcurrenti , βcurrentj , ti,j) ∈ E for each channel.
Ui wants to transfer vali,j to Uj, provided Uj has authorized the same. If βcurrenti ≥ vali,j, then
update the channel as (idi,j , βstarti , βstartj , βcurrenti − vali,j , βcurrentj + vali,j , ti,j) and return 1.
Else none of the balances of the payment channels in PC is modified and payChannel returns 0.
2.1 Privacy Goals of the Protocol
– Value Privacy - It guarantees that neither the participants involved in routing the payment
nor any corrupted user outside the payment path will have any knowledge about the transaction
amount being send from sender to receiver.
– Relationship Anonymity - Given two simultaneous successful pay operations (U ′0, U ′n, val)
and (U ′′0 , U ′′n , val) via same set of intermediaries Ui ∈ V where U ′0 6= U ′′0 and U ′n 6= U ′′n , with
each intermediate channel forwarding the same amount of flow for both the cases. If at least one
intermediate party is honest and rest all are corrupted, then none of the corrupted intermediate
parties can distinguish between payment (U0,′ , U ′n, val) and (U ′′0 , U ′′n , val) with probability more
than 1/2.
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– Consistency - The protocol is consistent if none of the nodes can claim funds from the pre-
decessor contract without obtaining the solution from the successor time-locked contracts. Non-
adjacent parties, upon collusion, cannot unlock their contracts by bypassing honest intermedi-
aries.
– Atomicity - A payment is said to be atomic if the receiver can claim the payment upon receiving
all the partial payment flow. The payment channels involved in routing aggregate their individual
secrets and provide it to the receiver. Upon receiving this value, the receiver can withdraw funds
from the network. If any of the party misbehaves and does not lock fund then the transaction
fails.
2.2 Ideal World Functionality
For modeling security and privacy definition of payment across several payment channels under
concurrent execution of an instance of CryptoMaze, we take the help of Universal Composability
framework, first proposed by Canetti et al. [12]. Our modeling of ideal functionality is similar to
[34] in terms of notation and assumption, opening and closing of channel. However the difference
lies in the procedure of payment. We do not consider linear path based payment. Instead we check
the condition on each channel whether the incoming off-chain contracts are consistent to form the
outgoing off-chain contracts.
Attacker Model Using the model suggested in [34], the nodes of the network are modeled as
interactive Turing machines, denoted by U = {Ui}, i ∈ V , U0 denotes the initiator of protocol
and Un denotes the receiver, which communicates with an ideal functionality F via secure and
authenticated channels. We model the attacker A as a PPT machine that is allowed to corrupt a
subset of nodes in the network. Upon corruption, it gets access to its internal state and controls
any transmission of information to and from the corrupted node. As of now, only static corruption
is allowed, i.e. adversary must specify the nodes it wants to corrupt before the start of the protocol.
Communication Model For encoding anonymous communication between two parties in the
ideal world, we define it in the following way - Using anonymous message transmission function-
ality Fanon, Ui sends packet (sid, instruction, Ui, Uj ,m), containing the secret message m to Uj .
(sid, instruction, Uj , |m|) is leaked to Sim [12], [11], without revealing the content of the message
and the identity of the sender.
An attacker can delay the delivery of messages arbitrarily. The network model is assumed to
be synchronous [12], [16], where any message sent out at ith round, gets delivered to the intended
recipient at (i+ 1)th round. Computation in this model is assumed to be instantaneous. However,
since we deal with the asynchronous network in the real world, a maximum time bound for message
transmission is set. If no message is delivered by the pre-decided expiration time, then the message
is considered as ⊥.
Assumptions We define an ideal functionality F for the PCN. Dummy parties in the set U
communicate with each other via F . If a user u in the network wishes to communicate anonymously
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with user v, it will use Fanon. Consider an underlying blockchain B which acts like a trusted append-
only ledger recording opening and closing of payment channels. An ideal functionality FB maintains
B locally. B is updated as per the transaction between parties. Any user can send a read instruction
to FB , where the whole transcript of B is sent as a reply. The number of entries of B is denoted
by |B|. An arbitrary condition can be specified in the contract in order to execute a transactions
in B. FB is entrusted to enforce that a contract is fulfilled before the corresponding transaction is
executed. Time is modeled as the number of entries of the blockchain B. By adding dummy entries
to B, time can be elapsed artificially. Users figure out the current time by counting the entries of
B. F uses Fanon and FB as subroutines.
Notations
Any payment channel existing in B is denoted by (idi,j , vi,j , ti,j , fi), where idi,j is the channel
identifier of the payment channel existing between dummy parties Ui and Uj , vi,j is the capacity
of the channel, ti,j is the expiration time of the channel and fi is the fee charged by the node Ui.
F maintains two lists internally - one for keeping track of the list of closed channels, denoted by
C and one for keeping track of the list of off-chain payments, denoted by L [34]. Upon executing
an off-chain payment in the channel idi,j , (idi,j , v′i,j , t′i,j , hi,j) is entered into L where v′i,j is the
payment forwarded to node Uj by Ui and t′i,j is the expiration time of the payment, hi,j is the
event identifier. When a channel (Ui, Uj) is closed on-chain, the channel identifier idi,j is entered
into list C. For routing payment from U0 to Un, payment channels involved in doing so is put in set
PC, added serially upon breadth first traversal of the network, starting from Un. The flow in each
channel idi,j present in PC is denoted by vali,j .
2.3 Basic Operations of Payment Channel Network in Ideal World
F initialized pair of local empty lists (L, C). Users in set U can query F for opening and closing
of channel, provided they are valid operations in sync with the state in L. We describe the basic
operations in PCN in the ideal world - open channel, close channel and payChannel.
– OPEN CHANNEL : Considering a user Ui wants to open a channel with Uj . Ui invokes F by
sending the message (open, idi,j , Uj , vi,j , ti,j , f), where vi,j is the channel capacity, ti,j is the
expiration time of the channel and f is the associated fee charged on using the channel. If there
is no other entry in B and no other inconsistencies are found, F sends (idi,j , vi,j , ti,j , f) to Uj .
Upon authorization by both parties, F adds (id(Ui,Uj), vi,j , ti,j , f) to B and (idi,j , vi,j , ti,j , hi,j)
to L where hi,j is the event identifier. The event identifier hi,j is returned to Ui and Uj .
– CLOSE CHANNEL : For a channel between Ui and Uj , if either of the party wants to close the
channel, it invokes F with the message (close, idi,j , hi,j). F checks for an entry in B of the form
(idi,j , vi,j , ti,j , f) and checks the list L for an entry (idi,j , v′i,j , t′i,j , hi,j), given that hi,j is a valid
event identifier. If idi,j ∈ C or t′i,j > |B|, ti,j ≤ t′i,j , then F aborts. Else (id(Ui,Uj), v′i,j , t′i,j , h′i,j)
is added to B and idi,j gets added to C. Both Ui and Uj is notified with the message (idi,j , hi,j).
– PAY: Given the tuple (pay, {(idi,j , vali,j , ti,j) : (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}) as input from U0, F executes the
following protocol:
• For a given node Ui, ∀Uk ∈ V, (Ui, Uk) ∈ PC, F samples a random hi,k and checks B for an
entry (idi,k, vi,k, ti,k, f), ∀Uj ∈ V, (Uj , Ui) ∈ PC, F samples a random hj,i and checks B for
an entry (idj,i, vj,i, tj,i, f). If all these entries exists, then it forms
−−−→
Iin,Ui = {(hj,i, idj,i, valj,i) :
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Uj ∈ V, (Uj , Ui) ∈ PC}, −−−−→Iout,Ui = {(hi,k, idi,k, vali,k, ti,k) : Uk ∈ V, (Ui, Uk) ∈ PC} F conveys
(
−−−→
Iin,Ui ,
−−−−→
Iout,Ui , tprev,i) to Ui via anonymous communication channel. As special case, it sends
(
−−−→
Iin,Un ,⊥, tprev,n) to Un. F checks whether for a given payment channel (Ui, Uj) having entries
of the form (idi,j , v′i,j , ∗, ∗) ∈ L, the following conditions hold true: v′i,j ≥ vali,j and tprev,i ≥
ti,j −∆. If it holds true, then F adds mi,j = (idi,j , v′i,j − vali,j , ti,j ,⊥) to L, v′i,j being the last
updated capacity of the payment channel (Ui, Uj). If any of the conditions fails, F removes all
such entries from L entered in this session and aborts.
• For all Ui ∈ PC, F queries Ui with ({hj,i : Uj ∈ V, (Uj , Ui) ∈ PC}, {hi,k : Uk ∈ V, (Ui, Uk) ∈
PC}), through an anonymous channel. If a node Uk returns ⊥ to F then update mk,v,∀v ∈
V, (k, v) ∈ PC to (_,_,_, hk,v) in L. ∀w ∈ V, (w, k) ∈ PC, remove mw,k from L.
Discussion The ideal functionality F captures the privacy properties of PCN:
– Value Privacy: Since the payment value is split across multiple channels, we claim that interme-
diate nodes as well as any adversary (without any access to F) lying outside the payment path
cannot figure out the total amount of the transaction.
– Relationship Anonymity: If there exist at least one honest intermediate node, then it receives
unique event identifier from F for each payment over any of its outgoing payment channel.
Since all the event identifiers are independently generated, any corrupted node neither draw
correlation nor figure out which of the payment (U ′0, U ′n, val) or (U ′′0 , U ′′n , val) got forwarded firs
with probability greater then 1/2.
– Consistency: As per the second step of payment, if a node returns failure while processing pay-
ment, none of the incoming payment channels can process their payment.
– Atomicity: F maintains all the contract list for each user Ui ∈ PC and keeps track of their status
in L. In the first step of payment, if at any node there is not enough capacity or discrepancy
in expiration time of event, then a failure is returned to U0. In case all conditions gets satisfied,
only then does the second step gets executed, with Un being able to claim payment.
Definition 2. UC Definition of Security. An environment Z present in both the ideal and real
world invokes the steps of execution of an instance by providing the input and receiving the output.
If Z cannot distinguish between Π in the real world and the ideal world functionality, then it is said
to be UC-secure. Formally stated,
Theorem 1. Given that λ is the security parameter, a protocol denoted by Π, UC-realizes an ideal
functionality F if for all computationally bounded adversary A attacking Π there exist a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator Sim such that for all probabilistic polynomial time environment Z such
that IDEALF,Sim,Z and REALΠ,A,Z are computationally indistinguishable.
3 Our Proposed Construction
3.1 Network Model and its Assumptions
The topology of the network is known by any node in the network since any opening or closing of
a channel is recorded on the blockchain. The payer chooses a set of paths to the receiver according
to her own criteria. The current value on each payment channel is not published but instead kept
locally by the users sharing a payment channel. Every user is aware of the payment fees charged by
each other user in the PCN. Pairs of users sharing a payment channel communicate through secure
and authenticated channels.
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3.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
Consider an elliptic curve group with generator G, with |G| = q and λ be the security parameter.
Discrete Logarithm Problem Given the elliptic curve G over a finite field Fq, where q = pn and
p is prime, the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is the following computational
problem: Given points P,Q ∈ G(Fq), find an integer a such that Q = aP , if a exists. This com-
putational problem is called the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem which forms the the
fundamental building block for elliptic curve cryptography [19].
Two Party ECDSA Signature An efficient two party ECDSA protocol stated by Lindell [31].
Given a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}|q|. A private and public key pair is
generated by sampling a random value x and corresponding public key Q = xG. The signature
algorithm over a message m proceeds as follows - Sample a random value k, construct R = kG
and e = H(m). Take rx, which is the x co-ordinate of R. Compute r = rx mod q and s = e+rxk
mod q. The signature is the tuple (r, s). Note that (r,−s) also forms a valid signature.
Given (m,r,s) and public key Q, the verification algorithm proceeds as follows - Compute e =
H(m) and calculate S′ = eG+r.Qs . Let x co-ordinate of S’ be sx. If r
?
= sx mod q then return 1
else return 0.
3.3 Subroutines used in CryptoMaze
We define the subroutines KeyGen, Setup, TimeLockContractCreate and TimeLockContractRe-
lease, which will be used in the payment phase of our protocol.
KeyGen Phase Each node v ∈ V independently samples a pair of public key and private key
(pkv, skv) : pkv = skvG, where skv $← {0, 1}λ and pkv is a point on the elliptic curve. The public
key is a long term key and it is used repeatedly across different instance of the protocol, until and
unless the secret key gets compromised.
Setup Phase Given a flow across a network for relaying funds from payer to payee, we map it
into set of payment channels, denoted by PC, ordered as per breadth-first traversal. Starting from
receiver node, the channels are ordered as per the algorithm stated in Procedure 1.
Consider the network, as shown in Fig.4. Starting from R, it has one incoming payment channel
ER with positive flow. This channel is inserted into the set PC. R is inserted into the queue Q. This
continues till the last node inQ is the sender S. The set constructed is PC = {ER,DE,CE,BD,BC, SA}.
Preprocessing Phase Consider a function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ as random oracle. U0 samples
n + 1 independent strings xi : xi ∈ Zq, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Since receiver node is the one with no outgoing
flow, funds of payment channel denoted by idu,r,∀u ∈ V, (u, r) ∈ PC, with receiver node as one of
the counterparty is locked for the least time. Let this be t0. For timelocked contracts established
with any other pair of nodes (v, u), check the value tu = tv,u = max{tu,w : ∀w ∈ V, (u,w) ∈ PC}+∆
for some positive value of ∆. Assign tv,u as the lock time for the contract on payment channel (v, u).
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Procedure 1: Mapping set of paths P into set of payment channels
1 Input: P
2 Output: PC
3 Initialize set PC = φ and a queue Q← φ.
4 Insert the receiver node r into Q.
5 while Q is not empty do
6 v ← Q.pop(). Mark v as visited.
7 Find out the incoming neighbours of v which has a positive flow in order to route the payment.
8 Insert these payment channel, with v as the counterparty, into the set PC and delete it from the
set P.
9 Insert all unvisited incoming neighbours of v into Q.
10 end
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Fig. 4: CryptoMaze : Setup
For each channel (u,w) ∈ E, denoted by idu,w with flow value valu,w, a commitment for locking
funds is constructed in the following way -
Ru,w = xwG + eu,w.pkw +Σ(w,i)∈PC:i∈VRw,i (1)
where pkw is the public key of w. eu,w is constructed as
eu,w = H(xwG +Σ(w,i)∈PC:i∈VRw,i||idu,w) (2)
If w = Un then Rw,i = φ and xw = x˜w, where x˜w is defined in Eqn. 4. For each node Ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
we construct Xi
Xi = (Σ(Uj ,Ui)∈PC:Uj∈V x˜j + xi)G (3)
where x˜j is defined in Eqn. 4. For all the outgoing neighbours j of u, Ru,j will be constructed
as shown in Eq. 2. For all the incoming neighbours d of u, Rd,u will be constructed as shown in
Eq. 1. The packets constructed for vertex u ∈ V \ {s, r} is mu = ({(Rd,u, vald,u) : d ∈ V, (d, u) ∈
PC}, tu, xu, {(Ru,j , tu,j , valu,j) : j ∈ V, (u, j) ∈ PC}, Xu). Receiver vertex r receives the following
information - mr = ({(Rd,r, vald,r) : d ∈ V, (d, r) ∈ PC}, tr, xr, φ,Xr). Sender nodes U0 uses an
anonymous secure communication channel to transfer the packets to each of the members Ui ∈
PC, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Fig. 5: CryptoMaze : TimeLockContractCreate Phase
TimeLockContractCreate Phase Any node u, except u = U0, waits for incoming contract to
be formed for a minimal amount of threshold time tθ (tθ of the order of milliseconds). Any contract
formed between u and any of its incoming neighbour, say d, is of the form contract(d, u,Rd,u, vald,u, td,u).
It also obtains a value x˜d where
x˜d = xd +Σ(j,d)∈PCx˜j , d ∈ V \ {s}
x˜d = xs, d = s
(4)
Given the information mu = ({(Rd,u, vald,u) : d ∈ V, (d, u) ∈ PC}, tu, xu, {(Ru,j , tu,j , valu,j) : j ∈
V, (u, j) ∈ PC}, Xu) for vertex u, it constructs the value Ru where
Ru = Σ(u,j)∈PC,j∈VRu,j (5)
and checks the following -
tu
?
= max{tu,j : (u, j) ∈ PC, j ∈ V }+∆ (6)
For all outgoing neighbours j of u, it constructs x˜u as defined in Eq. 4. For all incoming neighbours
d of u,
ed,u = H(xuG +Ru||idd,u)
Rd,u
?
= (xu + ed,u.sku)G +Ru
Xu
?
= x˜uG
(7)
If all the equations hold true, then u sends value x˜u to j as well as forms the contract contract(u, j, Ru,j , valu,j , tu,j).
For forming an off-chain contract in a channel (u, v), we leverage on ECDSA based scriptless lock-
ing, as defined in [35]. It is compatible with Bitcoin and incurs less space overhead required for
other cryptographic operations like hash based scripts [41].
TimeLockContractRelease Phase The release phase starts from the receiver node Un = r
where it checks whether it can construct the discrete log of Xr
x˜r = xr +Σ(u,r)∈PC:u∈V x˜u
Xr
?
= x˜rG
(8)
This shows that the key required by r to claim the money is indirectly dependent on the participation
of all the channels present in the route PC. If any of the node deviates from the protocol then the
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payment will fail. It then proceeds to release the condition for all the incoming contracts in order
to claim the money.
We provide a generic procedure of the release phase followed by a node u ∈ V \ {s} for its
incoming contract Rw,u, (w, u) ∈ PC formed with node w. It constructs
sw,u =
{
x˜u, u = r
xu +Σ(u,v)∈PC:v∈V ru,v, u ∈ V \ {s, r}
ew,u = H(sw,uG||idw,u)
rw,u = sw,u + ew,usku
(9)
The value rw,u is revealed to node w. Since we use ECDSA based scriptless locking, node u will
provide the required information for completing the ECDSA signature, which can be verified by w.
3.4 Formal Description of the Protocol
The operation openPaymentChannel and closePaymentChannel has already been defined as fol-
lows:
openPaymentChannel(Ui, Uj , βi, βj , t) : This operation results in opening of channel between
user Ui and Uj . Given the initial bitcoin addresses of Ui and Uj , each party, upon authorization,
deposits βi and βj in the channel denoted by channel identifier idi,j . The channel timeout period
is t. After the operation of bitcoin deposit gets successfully added to the blockchain, it is reported
as success by returning 1. Upon failure, 0 is returned,
closePaymentChannel(idi,j) : This operations allows two users Ui and Uj mutually agree to
close a channel between them denoted by channel identifier idi,j . Get the balance of each Ui and
Uj in the channel denoted by remain(Ui, Uj) and remain(Uj , Ui). Update the bitcoin balance as
per this information and reflect the same in the Bitcoin blockchain. Return 1 if the operation is
successful else return 0.
We first define the interfaces of ideal functionality FECDSA−Lock in Fig. 6, which has access to
a Random Oracle. The interfaces are KeyGen, Lock and Verify. KeyGen generates a common
public key for a payment channel idi,j between parties Ui and Uj . The Lock Phase is same as
generating ECDSA signature but with a difference that instead of R = kG, we use the value Y
sampled by sender U0 for establishing locks in each channel. The construction is same as defined
in [35]. The Verify phase ensures that the correct key is released for completing the signature and
a valid party gets to claim the money, as stated in the timelock contract.
payChannel({idi,j : (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, val): Given a network flow for routing the transaction (s, r, val)
from s = U0 to r = Un using the payment channels in PC, obtained after execution of Setup Phase.
The details of payChannel for sender, receiver and intermediate nodes, considering our protocol
has access to ideal functionalities FB ,Fanon and FECDSA−Lock.
In Procedure 2, sender first calculates the cost of routing the transaction through the channels in
PC, including the fee charged by each intermediate hop, denoted by value val0. It checks whether it
has enough funds remaining in its channel to route the payment, given that valU0,Uj is the flow from
U0 to each of its outgoing neighbour Uj : val0 = Σ(U0,Uj)∈PCvalU0,Uj ,∀Uj ∈ V . If not, it will abort
the payment. Else it constructs the contract information for each intermediate node, as shown in
Preprocessing Phase. The information is propagated to each user via anonymous channel. Next,
it establishes contract with each of its outgoing neighbour, assigning a legitimate timeout period
within which the counterparty has to resolve the payment.
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KeyGen
Upon receiving (key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, Uj) from Ui and
(key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, Ui) from Uj :
– Sample a secret key sk ← Zq
– Compute a public key pk = sk.G
– Output the message (key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, pk) to Ui and Uj
– Store (key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, sk)
Lock
Upon receiving (lock, sid, ssid,m, Y, pk) from both Ui and Uj :
– If (lock, sid, ssid) is already stored, abort.
– Check if (key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, sk) for the given pk : pk = skG has
been stored.
– Sample k ← Zq and compute (rx, ry) = R = kY
– Query the Random Oracle at point (sid, ssid,m), which returns H(m).
– Compute s = k−1(H(m) + rxsk)
– Send a output (lock, sid, ssid, (s, rx)) to Ui and Uj
– Store (lock, sid, ssid)
Verify
Upon receiving (verify, sid, ssid,m, r′, k, pk) from both Ui and Uj :
– If (lock, sid, ssid) is not stored then abort.
– Parse k and retrieve (r, s)
– Query the Random Oracle at point (sid, ssid,m), which returns H(m).
– Compute s′ = s
r′ and (sx, sy) = S
′ = H(m)G+r.pk
s′
– Check sx
?
= r, if true return (verified, sid, ssid) to Uj
Fig. 6: Interface of ideal world functionality FECDSA−Lock
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The intermediate parties Uj , j ∈ V \ {U0, Un} get the terms of the contract from the inter-
mediate node along with a decision, as shown in Procedure 3. If the decision is forward, then it
will check the consistency of incoming contracts with the terms stated for outgoing contract. Upon
validation, it calls the subroutine TimeLockContractCreate and accesses FECDSA−Lock to es-
tablish a partial ECDSA signature on the contract. Only a counterparty with valid information
can complete the signature and claim payment upon verification. If the decision is OK, then it
calls TimeLockContractRelease module, constructs the key to be propagated to the incoming
contracts for completing the signature. The party receiving the key checks whether the signature is
complete by querying FECDSA−Lock. Upon verification, the success message is propagated to the
predecessor. If any of the phase fails or no decision is sent out, then abort is triggered. Abort restores
the channel balance to its previous valid state and requests all parties to cancel the contract.
The receiver gets the secret share from all the nodes and constructs x˜Un , as shown in Procedure
4. Even if one payment channel fails in establishing contract, receiver will not be able to claim
payment. This guarantees the property of atomicity. Receiver triggers the release phase and sends
the information along with the decision OK to all its incoming neighbours.
Procedure 2: Payment Protocol for sender
1 Input: PC, U0, val
2 val0 = val +ΣUi∈PC\{U0,Un)fee(Ui)
3 if val0 ≤ Σ(U0,Uj)∈PC remain(U0, Uj), ∀Uj ∈ V then
4 for Uj ∈ V : (U0, Uj) ∈ PC do
5 remain(U0, Uj) = remain(U0, Uj)− valU0,Uj
6 end
7 t0 = tnow +∆.l, l is the maximum level traversed during bfs on the set of paths P.
8 for Ui ∈ [1, n− 1] do
9 Call Preprocessing Phase on node Ui
10 Get mUi = ({(RUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) : Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}, tUi , xUi , {(RUi,Uj , tUi,Uj , valUi,Uj ) :
Uj ∈ V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, XUi)
11 Send (mUi , forward) to Ui via Fanon.
12 end
13 Get mUn = ({(RUd,Un , valUd,Un) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Un) ∈ PC}, tUn , xUn , φ,XUn) to Un
14 Send (mUn , forward) to Un via Fanon.
15 for Uj ∈ V : (U0, Uj) ∈ PC do
16 Generate a random message m← {0, 1}∗
17 Uj sends the message (key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, U0) to FECDSA−Lock, receives a public key
(key-gen, sid, ssid, pk)
18 query FECDSA−Lock on Lock(sid, ssid,m,RU0,Uj , pk)
19 if FECDSA−Lock returns (sid, ssid, (r, s)) then
20 contract(U0, Uj , (r, s), valU0,Uj , tU0,Uj )
21 end
22 else
23 remain(U0, Uj) = remain(U0, Uj) + valU0,Uj
24 end
25 end
26 end
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3.5 Privacy Analysis
Theorem 2. Given the elliptic curve group of order q generated by the base point G, the proto-
col CryptoMaze UC-realizes the ideal functionality F in the (FB ,Fanon,FECDSA−Lock )-hybrid
Random Oracle model.
In order to prove Theorem 2, the ideal world simulator Sim, a PPT algorithm, needs to ensure
the output of execution of the an instance of the protocol CryptoMaze in (FB ,Fanon,FECDSA−Lock)-
hybrid world is indistinguishable as that in the ideal world, even in presence of corrupt parties. We
consider here the following cases for basic PCN operations - openPaymentChannel (if any one party
is malicious), closePaymentChannel(if any one of the parties is malicious) and payChannel, to be
simulated by a PCN. The environment Z can use the information leaked by adversary A or actively
influence the execution. It supplies the input to the parties, gets the output and can even corrupt
any parties to learn their internal values, control the execution by keeping a tab on the input and
output send from that party.
openPaymentChannel(idi,j, β, t, f) Given a payment channel between user Ui and Uj , channel
identifier idi,j , with Ui initiating the request for opening a channel, with balance β, timeout value
t and fee f is the fee charged on using the channel.
– Ui is corrupted: On corruption of user Ui by adversary A, a channel open request (idi,j , β, t, f)
is send to Sim. Both the parties engage in two party agreement over a local channel identifier
idi,j . Upon success, Sim sends (open, idi,j , β, t, f) to F , which will return event identifier h.
– Uj is corrupted: Sim receives (idi,j , β, t, f) from F . It now executes a two party agreement
with A for opening a channel. If successful, Sim sends an accepting message to F , which will
return an event identifier h.
closePaymentChannel(idi,j, h) Given an existing channel id(Ui,Uj) between Ui and Uj with
event id h, with Ui initiating the request.
– Ui is corrupted:A sends a channel close request (close, idi,j , h) to Sim. It checks L for an entry
(idi,j , β
′, t′, h). If this value exists then it sends (close, idi,j , h) to F . Else the process aborts.
– Uj is corrupted: Sim receives (close, idi,j , h) from F . It notifies A of the closing of the channel
idi,j .
payChannel({(idi,j, vali,j, ti,j) : (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, val) : We analyse it for each of the entity:
when the sender U0 is corrupt, when an intermediate party Ui is corrupt and when the receiver Un
is corrupt.
– U0 is corrupt: AdversaryA samplesmUi = ({(RUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) : Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}, tUi , xUi ,
{(RUi,Uj , tUi,Uj , valUi,Uj ) : Uj ∈ V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, XUi) for each Ui ∈ V \ {U0, Un} and
mUn = ({(RUd,Un , valUd,Un) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Un) ∈ PC}, tUn , xUn , φ,XUn) for Un. It sends
this value to Sim. For each of the nodes Ui, Sim parses mUi and checks that terms of its
incoming contract and outgoing contract are related to each other. If this holds, it checks
whether for each of its outgoing neighbour Uj , tUi,Uj = tUi − ∆ and the channel (Ui, Uj) has
enough capacity to channelize the flow valUi,Uj . If all the condition holds true, Sim sends
the tuple (pay, {(idk,i, valk,i, tk,i) : (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC, Uk ∈ V }, {(idi,j , vali,j , ti,j) : (Ui, Uj) ∈
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Procedure 3: Payment Protocol for intermediate node Ui
1 Input : (m, decision)
2 if (decision is forward) then
3 parse m to get {(RUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) : Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}, tUi , xUi , {(RUi,Uj , tUi,Uj , valUi,Uj ) :
Uj ∈ V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, XUi
4 Call TimeLockContractCreate Phase on Ui with m as the input
5 Calculate x˜Ui = xUi +Σ(Uk,Ui)∈PCx˜Uk
6 if all the conditions of incoming and outgoing contract hold true then
7 for Uj ∈ V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC do
8 if (valUi,Uj ≤ remain(Ui, Uj)) ∧ (tUi,Uj = tUi −∆) then
9 wait for a time tθ
10 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
11 if (!isContract(Uk, Uj)) then
12 abort the process
13 end
14 end
15 remain(Ui, Uj) = remain(Ui, Uj)− valUi,Uj
16 Generate a random message m′ ← {0, 1}∗
17 Uj sends the message (key-gen-ecdsa, sid, ssid, Ui) to FECDSA−Lock, receives a public
key (key-gen, sid, ssid, pk)
18 query FECDSA−Lock on Lock(sid, ssid,m′, RUi,Uj , pk)
19 if FECDSA−Lock returns (sid, ssid, (r, s)) then
20 contract(Ui, Uj , (r, s), valUi,Uj , tUi,Uj )
21 Send x˜Ui to Uj
22 end
23 else
24 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
25 Send (({(RUd,Uk , valUd,Uk ) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
26 end
27 abort the process
28 end
29 end
30 else
31 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
32 Send (({(RUd,Uk , valUd,Uk ) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
33 end
34 abort the process
35 end
36 end
37 end
38 else
39 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
40 Send (({(RUd,Uk , valUd,Uk ) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
41 end
42 end
43 end
44 else if (decision is ⊥) then
45 Parse m to get {(RUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) : Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}
46 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
47 remain(Uk, Ui) = remain(Uk, Ui) + valUk,Ui
48 Send (({RUd,Uk : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
49 end
50 end
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51 else if (decision is OK) then
52 Parse m to get {(RUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) : Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}, tUi , xUi , {(RUi,Uj , tUi,Uj , valUi,Uj ) :
Uj ∈ V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, XUi
53 for Uj ∈ V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC do
54 Retrieve m′, (r, s), pk used in the contract
55 Call TimeLockContractRelease Phase on Ui with input RUi,Uj
56 Get rUi,Uj and query FECDSA−Lock on V erify(sid, ssid,m′, rUi,Uj , (r, s), pk)
57 if (FECDSA−Lock returns (⊥, sid, ssid)) then
58 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
59 Send (({(RUd,Uk , valUd,Uk ) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
60 end
61 abort the process
62 end
63 end
64 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
65 Send (({(RUj ,Uk , valUj ,Uk ) : Uj ∈ V, (Uj , Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk , xUk , {(RUk,Ud , tUk,Ud , valUk,Ud) :
Ud ∈ V, (Uk, Ud) ∈ PC}, XUk ), OK) to Uk
66 end
67 end
68 else
69 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC do
70 Send (({(RUd,Uk , valUd,Uk ) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
71 end
72 end
Procedure 4: Payment Protocol for receiver
1 Input: PC, Un, valUn , tUn , XUn , {x˜Uk : (Uk, Un) ∈ PC, ∀Uk ∈ V }
2 if (tUn > t
′ +∆) ∧ (valUn = val) then
3 x˜Un = Σ(Uk,Un)∈PCxUk , ∀UkinV
4 if XUn
?
= x˜UnG then
5 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Un) ∈ PC do
6 Send (({(RUj ,Uk , valUj ,Uk ) : Uj ∈ V, (Uj , Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk , xUk , {(RUk,Ui , tUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) :
Ui ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}, XUk ), OK) to Uk
7 end
8 end
9 end
10 else
11 for Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Un) ∈ PC do
12 Send (({(RUd,Uk , valUd,Uk ) : Ud ∈ V, (Ud, Uk) ∈ PC}, tUk ),⊥) to Uk
13 end
14 end
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PC, Uj ∈ V }) to F . For the receiver Un, it checks it XUn = x˜UnG. If this holds true, it sends
(pay, {(idk,n, valk,n, tk,n) : (Uk, Un) ∈ PC, Uk ∈ V }) to F .
Sim confirms the payment for a payment channel (Ui, Uj) only when it receives from the user Uj
an rUi,Uj = Σ(Uj ,Ul)∈PCrUj ,Ul such that RUi,Uj = (rUi,Uj+xUj+eUi,UjskUj )G. In case A outputs
an r∗ for (Uj , Uk) such that RUj ,Uk = r∗G but rUi,Uj 6= Σ(Uj ,Ul)∈PC,Ul 6=UkrUj ,Ul + r∗ then Sim
aborts. But finding an r∗ is equivalent to breaking discrete logarithm hardness. Probability of
this event is 1q , q = |G|, which is negligible since q is a large prime number. If the receiver is
honest then Sim confirms the payment if the amount valUn corresponds to what was agreed
with the sender, provided XUn = x˜UnG. If payment is confirmed for a channel (Ui, Uj), then an
entry (idi,j , v′i,j − vali,j , ti,j , hi,j) to L is added to L where v′i,j is the last updated capacity of
channel idi,j .
– Un is corrupt: Sim receives (
−−−→
Iin,Un ,⊥, tprev,n) from F . Sim samples a random x′ $← Zq and
returns to A the tuple (x′, x′G, valUn). If the adversary returns ˜xUn : x′ = x˜Un then Sim return
T to F , otherwise it aborts.
– ∀Ui ∈ V \ {U0, Un}, Ui is corrupt: Sim receives a tuple (−−−→Iin,Ui ,
−−−−→
Iout,Ui , tprev,i) from F , which
corresponds to the corrupted user Ui. Sim samples xi
$← Zq, XUi $← Zq and rUi,Uj ,∀Uj ∈
V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC : RUi,Uj = rUi,UjG. It forms RUi = Σ(Ui,Uj)∈PCRUi,Uj . For each (Uk, Ui) ∈
PC, it queries Random Oracle at point (xiG + RUi ||idUk,Ui) and gets the value HUk,Ui . It
then computes RUk,Ui = xi + HUk,UiRUi ,∀Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC and forms the message
mUi = ({(RUk,Ui , valUk,Ui) : Uk ∈ V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC}, tUi , xUi , {(RUi,Uj , tUi,Uj , valUi,Uj ) : Uj ∈
V, (Ui, Uj) ∈ PC}, XUi). A gets mUi . If it can output r∗ such that RUi = r∗G then Sim aborts.
Probability of finding such an r∗ is is negligible, given that A is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm and finding an r∗ is equivalent to breaking discrete logarithm problem. Probability of
this event is 1q , q = |G|, which is negligible since q is a large prime number. Thus the probability
that Sim aborts is also negligible. If Sim had been queried at ({hj,i : Uj ∈ V, (Uj , Ui) ∈
PC}, {hi,k : Uk ∈ V, (Ui, Uk) ∈ PC}), then it would have returned r′ to A on behalf of all the
outgoing neighbours of Ui. Then A could have easily constructed rUk,Ui : (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC,∀Uk ∈
V . Sim would have send T to F and added (idk,i, v′k,i − valk,i, tk,i, hk,i) to L, where ∀Uk ∈
V, (Uk, Ui) ∈ PC, v′k,i is the last updated capacity of channel idk,i.
From analysis each of the cases, it is clear that the distinguishing event of execution of protocol
in the real world from that in the ideal world is whenever Sim aborts. This is possible only if A
can output the discrete logarithm of the commitment given in the contract, without querying Sim.
However, this event is possible with negligible probability as per the assumption of hardness of
discrete logarithm.
4 Performance Analysis
4.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we define the experimental setup. The code for CryptoMaze is available in [1]. Sys-
tem configuration used is : Intel Core i5-8250U CPU, Kabylake GT2 octa core processor,
frequency 1.60 GHz, OS : Ubuntu-18.04.1 LTS (64 bit). The programming language used is C,
compiler - gcc version 5.4.0 20160609. The library igraph was used for generating random graphs
of size ranging from 50 to 25000, based on Barábasi-Albert model [6], [10]. Payment Channel Net-
work follows the scale free network where certain nodes function as hub (like central banks), having
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higher degree compared to other nodes [27]. For implementing the cryptographic primitives in both
CryptoMaze and Multi-hop HTLC, we use the library OpenSSL, version-1.0.2 [48] and SHA-256 has
been modeled as a random oracle. For constructing the zero-knowledge proof for Multi-hop HTLC,
we have used C-based implementation of ZKBoo[5]. The number rounds for running the protocol
is set to 136, which guarantees soundness error of 2−80 for the proof and witness length is set to 32
bytes. For implementing CryptoMaze, we have considered the elliptic curve secp224r1.
4.2 Evaluation
Fig. 7: Time taken for Payment
Fig. 8: Communication overhead
Following metrics are used to compare the performance of the payment protocol, CryptoMaze
with Multi-Hop HTLC [34]:
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– TTP (Time taken for payment) : Given set of paths for payment transfer, it is the time taken
for construction of hashed time-lock contract across all the edges in the path and completion of
payment upon successfully fulfilling the criteria set in the contract.
– Communication Overhead: For the given payment protocol, the number of message packets ex-
changed between the nodes in terms of bytes.
For the graph given in Fig. 4, in order to transfer a value of 10 Satoshis from S to R, two paths
S → B → C → E → R and S → B → D → E → R are obtained, each carrying 5 Satoshis.
Multi-hop HTLC is applied to each path, one at a time. The time taken to complete the payment
protocol is 1.53s and communication overhead is 6.483 MB, considering each path having 5 users
each. On executing CryptoMaze for the same payment, the execution time taken is 1.9ms and com-
munication overhead is 1.087 KB.
Testing on Real Instances. We test our protocol on a Ripple network [33], comprising around
20000 nodes. Our proposed payment protocol takes around 10s to complete the payment with a
communication overhead of less than 1.5 MB. Multi-hop HTLC takes around 65s to complete the
protocol and incurs a communication overhead of 26 MB. Considering an instance of Lightning Net-
work as stated in [46], comprising 2500 nodes. It takes around 485ms and communication overhead
of 0.16 MB as compared to 10.6s and communication overhead of 24 MB by Multi-hop HTLC.
Testing on Simulated Instances. We consider synthetically generated graphs, with the number
of nodes ranging from 10 to 20000. We vary the source-sink pair and use value 40 for transfer from
payer to a payee for all the instances. Apart from simulated graphs, Overall, the result demon-
strates the benefit of considering all the split simultaneously instead of one path at a time in terms
of scalability and efficiency in terms of computation cost and resource utilization.
5 Related Works
Payment Channel Network is a peer-to-peer, path-based transaction (PBT) network where each
party operates independently of other parties. Several P2P path-based transaction networks such
as such as Lightning Network for Bitcoin [41], Raiden Network for Ethereum [4], SilentWhispers
[33], InterLedger [49], Atomic-swap [3], TeeChain [30] etc. have been developed over the years.
In Table 1, we compare the properties of CryptoMaze with existing payment protocols. Privacy
guarantee offered by PCN and its challenges has been extensively discussed in [7], [25], [22]. A
payment along a path must be atomic - either it succeeds fully or it is aborted. Partial satisfaction
of a transaction may lead to loss of funds. As a solution, Hashed Time-lock Contract [41] was
proposed for Lightning Networks. It is compatible with the Bitcoin script but has its demerits.
Bolt [21] states about a hub-based payment construction retaining payment anonymity but it is
restricted to just two-hop payment. TumbleBit [23] follows a similar approach assuring payer/payee
privacy but suffers from the same shortcoming. Malavolta et al. [34] had proposed a secure version
of payment for multi-hop path based on zero-knowledge proof system ZK-Boo [20]. It uses Multi-
hop HTLC, working on one path at a time. Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks, defined in [35], are
compatible with vast majority of cryptocurrencies. It is generic as well as interoperable, supporting
both script and scriptless support for PCN. An efficient privacy-preserving payment protocol based
on Chameleon Hash Function [52] was proposed which is devoid of complex key management and
zero-knowledge proof. But in this protocol, honest intermediaries lying on a path are susceptible to
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Table 1: Comparison among the existing Payment Protocols in PCN
Algorithm Atomic single path/multiple
path payment
Privacy Violation/Other Disadvan-
tage
Wormhole Attack
Hashed Timelock Contract
[41]
Atomic single path payment No Balance Security, Payment
Correlation possible, can identify
sender and receiver with some ob-
servation.
Susceptible
Sprites [37] Strong atomic single path
payment
No relationship anonymity, sender
and receiver identity revealed as
well.
Not applicable
SilentWhisper [33] Multiple Path payment but
atomicity guaranteed for
single path
Costly multi-party computation for
determining credit available on each
path, privacy leakage due to knowl-
edge of minimum funds available on
each channel
Not possible
Multi-hop HTLC [34] Atomic single path payment Too much communication over-
head, use of complex zero knowl-
edge proofs
Not possible
Anonymous Multi-hop Lock
[35]
Atomic single path payment Privacy Preserving but applicable
for single path payment
Not possible
Atomic Multi Channel Up-
date with Constant Collat-
eral [18]
Strong atomic single path
payment
Violates relationship anonymity,
practically not yet realized
Not applicable
Atomic Multi-path Payment
[2]
Atomic multi path payment High Latency Each path is suscep-
tible to attack
Boomerang [8] Atomic multi path payment Too much redundancy in order to
reduce latency
Each path is suscep-
tible to attack
CryptoMaze Atomic multi path Payment Efficient and Privacy Preserving Not possible
key exposure attacks. However, all such payment protocols deal with routing transactions via single
path. All these works assumes a staggered locktime across the path, involving high collateral cost.
Later, Sprites [37], an ethereum styled payment network, first proposed the idea of using constant
locktime for resolving payment. If at least one channel reports successful payment transfer, all the
channels involved in relaying payment must update their state. Privacy was violated as the path
information, identity of sender and receiver was known by all participants involved in routing the
payment. Similar concept of reducing collateral cost using constant locktime contracts was proposed
for Bitcoin-compatible payment networks in [18]. Even if one party misbehaved, the payment failed
entirely. However, it violated relationship anonymity and the proposed protocol is yet to be realized
practically. Other protocols for cross-chain payment [24] have been studied but there is substantial
leakage of information violating transaction privacy.
SilentWhisper proposed multi-path payment but at the cost of substantial computation over-
head. Also, it failed to capture atomicity. This might lead to partial transfer of funds, as the
possibility of payment failing in certain paths exist. State-of-the-art on atomic multi-path payment
by Osuntokun [2] captures atomicity by using linear secret sharing across the various paths routing
partial payments but it lacks security model. A particular path uses same payment hash, formed
with a secret share, across multiple hops for relaying the partial payment. Hence intermediate nodes
in that path become susceptible to Wormhole attack [35]. It suffers from high latency as well where
the receiver has to wait for all the paths to complete the formation of off-chain contracts. In the
event of failure even in one path, the contracts has to be canceled across all the remaining paths.
The problem of latency is claimed to be solved by another payment protocol, Boomerang [8]. To
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increase throughput at reduced latency, payment is split across k paths and sender uses k+n, n > 0
paths for relaying transaction, so that success is guaranteed even if some path fails. If k such
paths have formed their contract, receiver must cancel the microtransactions on the remaining n
redundant paths. However the redundant paths are susceptible to Griefing attack [18], [44] as inter-
mediate nodes may withhold the cancel message from being propagated to the sender. Recently, a
new technique based on Dynamic Internal Payment Splitting [17] recursively splits payments across
multiple intermediaries in state channel network and receiver aggregates such payment receipts for
claiming payment. But this protocol does not strictly adhere to the requirement of atomic transfer
of payment and it will not work for the Bitcoin-based payment channel network.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel privacy-preserving, off-chain payment protocol for Payment
Channel Network, CryptoMaze, guaranteeing atomicity, i.e. either the payment succeeds fully or
fails entirely. It transfers funds across across several payment channels involved in routing in a
breath-first fashion, instead of considering each path individually. This ensures faster resolution of
payment. ECDSA based scriptless locking can be incorporated for establishing timelocked contract,
reducing space overhead. We analysed the performance of the protocol on some real instances like
Lightning Network and Ripple Network. From the results, it was inferred that our proposed payment
protocol has less execution time and low communication overhead as compared to existing payment
protocols like Multi-hop HTLC [34]. It is efficient and scalable as the setup phase doesn’t require
any complex computation. Our protocol instance has been defined for a transaction between a payer
and payee but it can be extended to handle multiple transactions by enforcing blocking protocol or
non-blocking protocol to resolve deadlocks in concurrent payments [34].
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